The Anticompetitive Effect of Vertical Most-Favored-Nation Restraints and the Error of Amex by Carlton, Dennis
  
 
THE ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF 
VERTICAL MOST-FAVORED-NATION 
RESTRAINTS AND THE ERROR OF AMEX 
Dennis W. Carlton* 
I. Introduction ................................................................... 93 
II. Vertical Most-Favored-Nation Restraints ................... 95 
III. Application to Credit Cards .......................................... 98 
IV. Application to Amex .................................................... 100 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Essay explains why the Supreme Court’s economic 
reasoning in its recent Ohio v. American Express Co. (“Amex”) 
decision is wrong. The Amex case involved the use of what are 
called “antisteering” restraints in which a retailer is not 
allowed to use a variety of tactics to steer a consumer away 
from using an American Express (“Amex”) card and toward 
using another payment mechanism.1 The reason why a 
merchant might want to do this is because the cost that the 
merchant incurs when a customer uses an Amex card can be 
higher than the cost that the merchant incurs when the 
customer uses either another credit card, debit card, or cash.2 
Although not challenged in the Amex case, the Amex 
contractual rules also prevent a retailer from imposing a 
surcharge on customers who use an Amex card to reflect the 
higher merchant cost.3 It is interesting to note that some 
 
* This paper is based on my William Howard Taft Lecture, presented 
September 14, 2018, delivered to the New York State Bar Association 
Antitrust Law Section. I thank Gustavo Bamberger, Daniel Feder, Patrick 
Gallagher, Allan Shampine, and Ralph Winter for helpful comments. 
1 See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2774, 2280 (2018).  
2 See id. at 2282–83.  
3 See United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 163 
(E.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. 
Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). 
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countries—such as Australia4—have regulated certain credit 
card fees, others have forbidden credit card companies from 
telling merchants that they cannot surcharge,5 and some 
states in the United States—such as New York6—have 
forbidden merchants from surcharging. Restraints on 
surcharging or steering are examples of restraints that Ralph 
Winter and I call “vertical most-favored-nation restraints,” 
(“vMFN”) in which one supplier tells a retailer that the 
retailer cannot set the retail price of its product higher than 
that of a rival, even if its wholesale price is higher than that 
of its rival.7 Such restraints have been the subject of some 
litigation already, but I expect that with the increasing use of 
web based platforms where such restraints are often used, 
litigation regarding such restraints will increase. 
This Article illustrates the underlying economic logic 
behind the anticompetitive effect of vMFNs.8 I then apply the 
reasoning to credit cards9 and finally, using the economic 
framework developed, explain the economic errors in the 
Court’s Amex decision.10 For a more detailed discussion, 
please see the Carlton and Winter paper referenced herein.11 
 
4 See, e.g., Competition and Consumer Amendment (Payment 
Surcharges) Act 2016 (Cth) sch 1 (Austl.). 
5 See Regulation (EU) 2015/751 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 29 April 2015 on Interchange Fees for Card-based Transactions, 
art. 11, 2015 O.J. (L 123) 1, 13. 
6 See N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 518 (McKinney 2018). 
7 Dennis W. Carlton & Ralph A. Winter, Vertical Most-Favored-Nation 
Restraints and Credit Card No-Surcharge Rules, 61 J.L. & ECON. 215 
(2018). I refer the interested reader to that paper for a more detailed 
discussion of the issues in this Essay, as well as for the mathematical proofs 
of key propositions. Both authors of that article have appeared as experts 
adverse to credit card companies in litigation in the United States and in 
foreign countries. Id. at 215.  
8 See infra Part II.  
9 See infra Part III.  
10 See infra Part IV.  
11 See Carlton & Winter, supra note 7. 
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II. VERTICAL MOST-FAVORED-NATION 
RESTRAINTS 
A vMFN is best illustrated by example. Suppose that there 
are two manufacturers. Manufacturer A produces product A 
while Manufacturer B produces product B. The two products 
compete with each other. Each manufacturer sells to a retailer 
at some wholesale price and the retailer then sets the retail 
price for each product. Manufacturer A tells the retailer that 
the retailer must abide by the following restriction: the retail 
price for product A can be no higher than that for product B, 
regardless of any difference in wholesale prices between the 
two products. Manufacturer B imposes the same restriction. 
What is the effect of these restrictions? 
Let’s use a simple example to illustrate the effect. Suppose 
that each product is so popular that every retail store wants 
to carry both products.12 In the absence of the vMFNs, 
Manufacturer A will set the wholesale price for its product and 
Manufacturer B will do the same. In deciding what wholesale 
price to set, Manufacturer A will recognize that if it lowers its 
wholesale price below that of product B, then that will 
typically lead the retailer to lower the retail price of product 
A below that of product B. By doing so, the retailer induces 
some consumers to switch from B to A in order to take 
advantage of the lower retail price of A. If Manufacturer A 
raises its wholesale price, it will recognize that it will lose 
some customers to B as the retailer responds to the higher 
wholesale price of A by raising the retail price of A relative to 
the retail price of B. Manufacturer B faces the same 
incentives. Depending on how strong the competitive forces 
are and the closeness of substitution of A and B, the wholesale 
price of A and B are driven down, perhaps all the way down to 
their own costs. That is how competition works. 
In contrast, with vMFNs, the incentives to lower price are 
dramatically changed. Now, if Manufacturer A lowers its 
wholesale price, the vMFN prevents the retailer from 
 
12 The “must-carry” restriction allows the analysis to focus on the main 
source of competition: the consumer’s ability to substitute products. See id. 
at 217.  
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lowering the retail price of product A relative to that of B. 
Therefore, there is no gain in sales arising from the lowered 
wholesale price as a result of a lower retail price of A relative 
to the retail price of B. This makes lowering the wholesale 
price less desirable than without the vMFNs. If Manufacturer 
A raises its wholesale price, then it no longer has to worry that 
it will lose sales at retail because its retail price will rise 
relative to that of product B. Again, the vMFNs guarantee 
that that cannot happen. So, the incentive to lower wholesale 
price is reduced while the incentive to raise the wholesale 
price is increased. In equilibrium, the result is that the 
wholesale and retail prices of both products A and B are above 
the level that results when there are no vMFNs.13 
In the absence of vMFNs, products A and B are substitutes 
in the precise sense that an increase in the wholesale price of 
product A, leads to a decline in demand for product A and an 
increase in demand for product B as customers respond to the 
lower retail price of product A. With vMFNs, if Manufacturer 
A raises his wholesale price, it creates an incentive for 
Manufacturer B to raise its wholesale price (assuming the 
price starts from below the monopoly level of Product B). In 
other words, instead of acting like substitutes, the products 
act like complements.14 Manufacturer A has an incentive to 
raise its price as does Manufacturer B, as long as each price is 
below the monopoly level.15 The vMFNs eliminate the 
competitive pressures between Manufacturer A and B and 
lead to higher prices than would occur without the vMFNs.16 
There is an additional anticompetitive effect from the use 
of vMFNs. Suppose there is some firm, Firm X, that wishes to 
enter to compete against Manufacturers A and B. Suppose 
further that Firm X intends to enter by following the strategy 
of charging a very low wholesale price. That strategy might 
 
13 See id. at 223. 
14 See id. 
15 In fact, there is an incentive to raise price even above the monopoly 
levels. See id. at 217. 
16 See id. at 223 (“Proposition 1. The equilibrium price in the [vMFN] 
pricing subgame (i) exceeds the equilibrium price in the [non-vMFN] pricing 
subgame and (ii) exceeds the perfectly collusive price.”). 
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work well in the world without a vMFN since the low 
wholesale price from Product X will be reflected in a low retail 
price for Product X, and that low retail price can induce large 
numbers of consumers to switch away from the higher priced 
Products A and B to Product X. In contrast, in a world with a 
vMFN, that incentive for retail customers to switch to Product 
X disappears as a result of the vMFN.17 Therefore, the vMFN 
creates an impediment to entry that does not exist in its 
absence. As a result, the vMFN restricts entry and thereby 
reduces the competitive pressures on Manufacturers A and B, 
leading to higher prices.18 
There is an additional effect from the vMFN. It enables 
dominant firms (“must carry” products) to impose a tax on 
other products.19 To illustrate this effect in a simple example, 
consider the following. Suppose initially that there is only 
Manufacturer A. Now suppose that there is some Product C 
that is competitively available to the retailer at some constant 
wholesale cost. The reader can think of Product C as a store 
brand. Let’s see what happens as a result of the vMFN. 
Without the vMFN, the retail price of Product A would be 
higher than the retail price of Product C. With the vMFN, 
those retail prices must be the same. The price of Product C 
will rise in order to equal the price of Product A. The new price 
of A can be either higher or lower than in the case without the 
vMFN. The retailer will now earn a margin on Product C (its 
retail price has risen but costs are unchanged). Manufacturer 
A, if she is able, will try to get that extra profit through some 
sort of payment from the retailer. It is as if Manufacturer A 
can place a tax on consumers of Product C and collect the 
proceeds of that tax.  
 
17 Discover attempted to implement this business model in the late 
1990s, but was unsuccessful due to the nondiscrimination provisions used 
by Amex and other card companies. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 
2774, 2293–94 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
18 Carlton & Winter, supra note 7, at 231.  
19 See id.  
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III. APPLICATION TO CREDIT CARDS 
The application of the above economic reasoning to credit 
cards is straightforward. Visa, Mastercard, and American 
Express all compete to attract merchants to accept their cards 
and customers to use their cards.20 The credit card firm 
influences the fee that a merchant must pay every time a 
customer uses one of its cards.21 If surcharging or steering 
were allowed at the point of sale, then a merchant could 
surcharge the most expensive card or otherwise discourage its 
use in order to induce the customer to use a cheaper card. Just 
as in the example involving Manufacturers A and B, the use 
of the vMFN prevents the forces of competition from acting, 
distorts them, and winds up increasing the fee that the 
merchant pays for each card compared to what it would have 
been in the absence of the no surcharge or no steering rule.22 
Just as in the example involving Manufacturers A and B, the 
use of the vMFN makes entry more difficult for any new credit 
card firm.23 This too causes the merchant fees to be elevated 
relative to what they would have been in the absence of the 
vMFN.24 
Debit cards and cash often are less costly for the merchant 
as a payment mechanism than credit cards. But no steering 
and no surcharge rules prevent a merchant from using certain 
incentives to induce retail customers to use these lower cost 
payment mechanisms.25 Just as in the example involving 
Manufacturer A and Product C, the use of a vMFN raises the 
 
20 See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2282. For simplicity, assume that 
each card belonging to the same payment network charges the same fees. 
This simplification is not necessary but makes the exposition easier. 
21 See id. at 2281.  
22 See supra Part II.  
23 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.  
24 See supra Part II.  
25 A merchant is not allowed to indicate to the consumer its preference 
for the means of payment (i.e., is not allowed to “steer” customers). See Am. 
Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2283. Amex rules do not allow surcharging of 
Amex cards unless other credit and debit cards are also surcharged the 
same amount. See id. However, discounts for cash and all debit are allowed. 
Id. 
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price to customers who wish to use debit and cash.26 That is 
an unambiguous harm to them. 
Finally, the reader may notice that I have not discussed 
rewards to cardholders. Indeed, the Court in Amex placed 
special emphasis on the fact that consumers receive rewards27 
as a unique feature of the industry that called for different 
legal treatment than usually occurs when there is a claim of 
an anticompetitive vertical restriction.28 I will discuss this a 
bit more in the next Part (and discuss it extensively in the 
Carlton & Winter article29). Here I make just one point: 
rewards used by credit card companies to attract consumers 
are similar in their function to promotions.30 Firms often 
engage in advertising, sales efforts, or discount coupons to 
select customers. In fact, analytically, one can show that there 
is no difference between the economic incentives to engage in 
promotion—a feature that has long been understood and 
studied—and the incentive to engage in rewards. Rewards are 
just another name for promotion. In Carlton & Winter, we 
prove this exact equivalence.31 No new economic principles 
are at work!32  
As we will see in the next Part, the Court in Amex seems 
to think that there is something very special in credit cards 
flowing from the fact that high merchant fees can be used to 
 
26 Carlton & Winter, supra note 7, at 234. 
27 See, e.g., Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2280 (“Cardholders also can 
receive rewards based on the amount of money they spend, such as airline 
miles, points for travel, or cash back.”). 
28 See id. at 2286 (“[C]ourts must include both sides of the platform—
merchants and cardholders—when defining the credit-card market.”). 
29 See generally Carlton & Winter, supra note 7. 
30 See Carlton & Winter, supra note 7, at 240.  
31 Id. at 237–38.  
32 In no way does this statement diminish the importance of 
understanding the two-sided nature of a credit card platform—or other 
platforms—or the intellectual contribution of Rochet and Tirole. See 
generally Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A 
Progress Report, 37 RAND J. ECON. 645 (2006). Quite the reverse. Failure 
to understand that contribution led the Court astray, as I explain below. 
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finance high reward payments to cardholders.33 There is no 
doubt that as merchant fees rise, more rewards can be 
financed and that the high merchant fees create an incentive 
for credit card firms to use rewards to get customers to use 
their card.34 But that same incentive exists if that high fee 
resulted from a cartel of the card companies to set the 
merchant fee at a high level. A cartel price creates incentives 
for cartel members to use promotion to get customers and earn 
the (inflated) cartel price.35  
IV. APPLICATION TO AMEX 
The Court in Amex made two key points. First, the Court 
said that the credit card market is “two-sided.”36 As a result, 
any economic analysis must take account of both sides of the 
market.37 Second, the Court said that because the credit card 
market is two-sided, different legal rules from those ordinarily 
used are needed for evaluating the effect of any vertical 
restriction in terms of whether the plaintiff or defendant bears 
the burden of proof of certain elements of the case. The second 
point is the more important one but we need to understand 
the first point before we can discuss the second. 
It is true, as the Court said, that the “market” for credit 
cards is two-sided. I use quotation marks around the word 
“market” because an antitrust market differs from how the 
term market has often been used in the economic literature. 
It would be more accurate to say that a credit card firm 
competes with other credit card firms and that each firm is a 
“platform” that has two sides.38 By two sides, the economic 
literature means that a credit card company must attract 
 
33 Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2288 (“On the other side of the market, 
Amex uses its higher merchant fees to offer its cardholders a more robust 
rewards program, which is necessary to maintain cardholder loyalty and 
encourage the level of spending that makes Amex valuable to merchants.”).  
34 See Carlton & Winter, supra note 7, at 230.  
35 See id.; see also George J. Stigler, Price and Non-Price Competition, 
76 J. POL. ECON. 149, 150–51 (1968).  
36 Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2280.  
37 See id. at 2286.  
38 See Rochet & Tirole, supra note 32, at 664.  
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merchants to make using the card desirable to consumers and 
it must attract merchants to make the card desirable to 
customers.39 The more merchants that accept the card, the 
more customers will be interested in having the card. 
Similarly, the more customers who have the card, the more 
merchants will be interested in accepting the card. There is a 
positive feedback between the two sides of the market. There 
is no question that this understanding of credit cards is an 
accepted view as reflected in a large body of literature, to 
which I and my various co-authors have contributed.40 
The economic literature sometimes describes a two-sided 
platform as one where a firm must get both sides “on board.”41 
A successful credit card firm needs both merchants and 
customers. But such a definition is vague and could apply to 
many markets since every transaction requires sellers and 
customers. As Rochet and Tirole explain, with such a 
definition “pretty much any market would be two-sided[.]”42 
But Rochet and Tirole explain that there is a way to 
distinguish one-sided from two-sided markets. The insight of 
Rochet and Tirole is that a two-sided market has the property 
that the price to each side of the market matters separately.43 
That is, it is not only the sum of the prices that matters but 
also the relative prices on each side of the market.44 So, for 
example, consider a standard example of a two-sided market, 
a newspaper. A newspaper sells ads to merchants and sells 
newspapers to readers. The newspaper sets two prices, one to 
its readers and the other to its merchants placing ads. The 
more readers the newspaper gets, the higher the rate it can 
charge for ads. The price to each side of the market matters. 
Similarly, in a transaction platform in which a transaction 
results in a simultaneous exchange between a consumer and 
a seller, the price to the seller and the price to the buyer 
 
39 See Carlton & Winter, supra note 7, at 217.  
40 For further reading, readers should look to the references in Carlton 
& Winter, supra note 7, at 250–51. 
41 See Rochet & Tirole, supra note 32, at 646.   
42 Id.   
43 See id. at 664–65. 
44 See id.  
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matters separately if the platform is two-sided. That is, the 
price a merchant pays for accepting a credit card and the 
rewards that a consumer receives for using a card matter 
separately. Otherwise, it is incorrect to label the platform as 
two-sided.  
The legal issue the Court opined on has to do with the legal 
procedure for evaluating vertical restrictions, of which no 
steering is an example.45 In the typical vertical restriction 
case, the three step procedure—which both sides in Amex 
adopted—is: (1) the plaintiff establishes that there is a harm 
to the competitive process; (2) the defendant can rebut by 
showing that there is a procompetitive justification for the 
restrictions, and (3) that the plaintiff can rebut, if necessary, 
by showing that even if there were a procompetitive 
justification, that there is a less restrictive alternative.46 So, 
for example, in an exclusive dealing case: the plaintiff shows 
that its inability to obtain distribution is a harm to the 
competitive process. The defendant then shows that the 
exclusive dealing generates so much promotion that output 
expands. The plaintiff can then rebut, if necessary, by showing 
there is a less restrictive alternative to exclusive dealing. 
From an economic view, it does seem sensible to place the 
burden of explaining the procompetitive rationale for the 
challenged conduct on the defendant, rather than the 
plaintiff, since that is the party with the most information 
about the practice.47 In Amex, though, the Court ruled that 
because credit cards are a two-sided market, the plaintiff has 
the burden of doing both step one and step two in order to 
show that there is a harm to the competitive process.48 The 
Court said that the plaintiff had the burden of defining an 
antitrust market that includes both sides and showing a harm 
in that market.49 The Court indicated that the plaintiff 
needed to show that the net price rose, presumably meaning 
 
45 See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2774, 2284 (2018). 
46 Id.  
47 Carlton & Winter, supra note 7, at 239.  
48 See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2287. 
49 Id. 
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the merchant fee minus rewards.50 Because the Department 
of Justice had failed to do that, the Court ruled in favor of 
Amex.51 By relabeling promotion as “rewards,” the Court 
turned an ordinary vertical restriction case into one that it felt 
broke new ground economically and legally and, therefore, 
had to be treated differently than the ordinary way vertical 
restriction cases have been handled.  
The Court’s economic reasoning is muddled. Breyer’s 
dissent is a clear enumeration of several of its salient flaws.52 
I discuss four errors here. 
The first error is its misunderstanding of two-sided 
markets. The Court’s use of the term and understanding of 
two-sided markets is confused. The Court claimed that 
because credit cards are a two-sided market, the plaintiff had 
the burden of showing that the net price was adversely 
affected by the restrictions.53 By “net price,” the Court 
appears to mean the price to merchants minus rewards to 
consumers.54 But the key insight of Rochet and Tirole is that 
in a two-sided platform, the price on each side of the platform 
matters separately.55 That is, it is not just the sum of prices 
to each side, but the relative prices on each side, that matters 
in a two-sided platform.56 Therefore, any interference with the 
setting of these relative prices is a distortion of the 
competitive process. That means that the antisteering rules, 
by their very nature, are a distortion of the competitive 
process since they alter the relative prices.57 This distortion of 
 
50 See id. The majority states that one must examine both sides of the 
market in order to determine the cost of credit card services “as a whole.” 
Id. I take that to mean that the Court focused on the “net price,” which I 
define as merchant fee minus customer reward. 
51 Id. at 2290.  
52 See id. at 2297–301 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
53 Id. at 2287.  
54 The Court appears to take the view that there are only linear fees on 
each side of the market, so that “net price” is well defined. It pays no 
attention to the fact that there may be annual fees or other nonlinear fees, 
in which case one cannot even define “net price” unambiguously. 
55 See Rochet & Tirole, supra note 32, at 664–65.  
56 See id.  
57 See Carlton & Winter, supra note 7, at 231.  
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the competitive process arises from the elimination of the 
competition among credit card firms at the point of sale, 
competition that would occur if merchants could surcharge or 
otherwise steer consumers away from more expensive credit 
cards.  
Second, the Court seems to understand that there can be 
justifications for vertical restrictions based on some well-
known free riding arguments.58 For instance, in the above 
example of exclusive dealing, a standard justification that 
defendants provide is that the exclusive dealing creates 
incentives to promote the product.59 But, as Breyer’s dissent 
makes clear, the free riding justification that the Court 
provides for Amex makes no economic sense.60 The free riding 
the Court talks about is the rewards that a consumer receives 
if she uses the Amex card.61 But if the merchant steers the 
consumer to use another card, the consumer does not receive 
the Amex rewards.62 There is no free riding off of the Amex 
rewards in the Court’s exposition.  
Third, the Court ignores what would seem like relevant 
economic evidence on several of the issues it raises. It ignores 
the evidence that the district court found that the antisteering 
rule harmed the entry of Discover into credit cards.63 It 
ignored the district court finding that there was no 
procompetitive justification for the antisteering rule.64 Even 
if one adopted the legal rules the Court espoused, this 
evidence would seem to lead to the conclusion that the 
plaintiff had established its case at step one.  
The fourth error relates to antitrust market definition. 
Market definition is always at most a crude first step in any 
 
58 See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2774, 2289–90 (2018). See 
generally DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 414–25 (4th ed. 2005).  
59 See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 58, at 421–22.   
60 Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2304 (2018) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting).  
61 Id.  
62 Id.  
63 Id. at 2293–94 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
64 Id. at 2294 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
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antitrust analysis and many complications regarding its 
usefulness arise when dealing with two-sided platforms. The 
Court claimed that although merchants obtain one service 
from a credit card firm and customers another, because the 
result is one transaction, the two services must be considered 
as one antitrust market.65 That approach can obscure the 
underlying economic forces. The credit card performs two 
different functions and those two go into making a 
transaction. Steel and rubber are used to make a golf club, but 
it would make no sense to claim that steel and rubber are in 
one market. Complements are not in the same antitrust 
market, even though the price of one complement can affect 
the demand for the other.66 An alternative procedure is to 
define antitrust markets in the usual way, from the point of 
view of a demander (either the merchant or consumer) and if 
they interact as they do in this case, to figure out the overall 
effect of any restriction. That is what would have happened 
from following the typical three-step procedure. Instead, the 
Court conflated steps one and two. 
What will be the effect of the Amex decision? From the 
viewpoint of economic analysis, which by its nature, would 
have considered all effects (i.e., on both sides of the market) 
from the vertical restriction even in the usual three step 
procedure, I don’t think much will change, at least 
conceptually. From the viewpoint of burden shifting, a lot 
could change. I suspect that placing the burden on the plaintiff 
in the way the Court proposes will make it more difficult for 
plaintiffs to prevail, even in cases where there is a clear 
interference in the process of competition with no offsetting 
justification. The beauty of the common law is that a bad 
decision can be either overturned or so confined to its unique 
facts that the effect of bad decisions can be mitigated. I hope 
that is what happens here.  
One thing I can predict is that, given the vagueness with 
which the Court has defined a two-sided market, a firm that 
is charged with using vertical restrictions in violation of the 
 
65 Id. at 2285–87.  
66 See id. at 2295 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
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antitrust laws will have an incentive to claim that it is 
operating in a two-sided, not one-sided, market in order to 
take advantage of the Amex decision, which I suspect will 
make it harder for plaintiffs to win. This illustrates why 
having different legal rules for promotional activity depending 
on whether the market is one-sided or two-sided markets is a 
mistake. 
 
